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Air Pollution Control in Allegheny
County-Will it be Smothered
by Appellate Procedure?
INTRODUCTION
One of the many reactions to the recent public uproar over the
state of the world's ecology was manifested in a set of strict air pollu-
tion control laws promulgated for Allegheny County. In order to
understand the character of these county air pollution control laws,
a basic acquaintance with the enabling legislation is helpful.
The Federal government's attack on air pollution began in earnest
with the passage of the Federal "Air Quality Act of 1967."2 This act
set up the machinery for the establishment of minimum Federal air
quality standards. The act, however, specifically states that its policy
is to encourage municipal, state, and interstate abatement of air pollu-
tion and that the Federal government will not impose its enforcement
powers on such political subdivisions as long as they do not contradict
the Federal air quality minimum standards.3 In line with this policy,
the Federal act set up the tools for the state and local enforcement of
air pollution standards. 4 Pennsylvania, having complied with these
Federal requisites, passed the "Air Pollution Control Act." 5 Under
this legislation the Pennsylvania Department of Health is placed in
charge of air pollution control. 6 Despite the detailed enforcement
procedure established under the Pennsylvania "Air Pollution Control
Act, ' 7 it allows the political subdivisions within Pennsylvania to act
on enforcement of their own air pollution problems without state in-
terference as long as the local subdivision maintains the state's mini-
mum standards for air quality.8 This is the section under which
1. ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA., HEALTH DEPT. RULES AND REGULATIONS, Article XVII
[Hereinafter cited as ALL. Co. REGS.].
2. Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq. (1967).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 1857d(c) requires, among other things, a letter of intent from the state's
governor to establish air quality standards within the Federal minimums and to enforce
these standards.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4001 et seq.
6. Id. § 4004.
7. Id. § 4012.
8. But such local enforcement bodies must be approved by the state "Commission";
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4012.
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Allegheny County obtained its authority to pass and enforce its own
air quality standards. The Pennsylvania "Air Pollution Control Act"
also provides that such local standards can be set only after public
hearings have been held. Pursuant to this requirement, Allegheny
County held hearings in the spring of 1969 resulting in enough public
pressure to produce the present set of air pollution standards; stricter
than those imposed by the state of Pennsylvania and the Federal
government.
My purpose is not to discuss the merits of the air quality standards
of Allegheny County, but to assume that the standards set are de-
sirable and to proceed to the problems of enforcing these standards.
Solution to many of these problems depends on the adequacy of ap-
propriations made for Allegheny County air pollution control. For the
purposes of this discussion, however, money for proper enforcement
of the Allegheny County Air Pollution Control Act (hereafter referred
to as Allegheny County Regulations) is assumed to be available.9
The discussion will be aimed instead at the effect of appellate pro-
cedure and judicial review on the enforceability of action taken under
the Allegheny County Regulations. The Allegheny County Regula-
tions provide for enforcement to commence, in most instances, by an
order issued from the Director of the Allegheny County Department
of Health.10 Director's orders, therefore, result from about every act
of enforcement initiated by the Allegheny County Department of
Health. Such acts vary from Emergency Orders to shutdown certain
industries" to the issuance of permits for the installation or operation
of fuel burning equipment.1 2 The ability to obtain compliance with
these and other orders often depends on the ability of the orders to
resist the attack of administrative and judicial appeals. In order to
accomplish this resistance the Allegheny air pollution enforcement
bodies, from the County Department of Health to the Board of Air
Pollution Appeals and Review, must be aware of the appellate proce-
dures and the scope of judicial review to which their orders may be
9. Under both the Federal "Air Quality Act of 1967" and the Pennsylvania "Air
Pollution Control Act" appropriations to state and local air pollution control agencies
are contemplated. The amount of these funds, however, will depend on annual appropria-
tions and the method of allocating this money. Therefore, discussion of this phase of
enforcement would involve mere speculation.
10. ALL. Co. REGS., § 1722.1A provides that "whenever a notice or order is given un-
der any provision of this Article, the Director shall give said notice or order in the
manner provided in this section."
11. Id., § 1722.1B.
12. Id., § 1718.
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subject and to what extent they might contribute to the establish-
ment of advantageous procedures. Understanding the appellate pro-
cedure and judicial review will allow the Allegheny County and Penn-
sylvania Departments of Health to react appropriately to insure
clarity in their rules and regulations regarding appellate procedure
and to handle grievances in a manner calculated to avoid reversals
based on their failure to follow proper hearing procedures.' 3 Knowl-
edge of the scope of possible judicial review will also help these agen-
cies know the practical limits of their decision-making power and
discretion.
DOES THE COUNTY'S AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH APPELLATE PROCEDURE
CONFLICT WITH STATE PROCEDURE?
As mentioned above, under many sections of the Allegheny County
Regulations, enforcement is initiated by orders from the Director of
the Allegheny County Dept. of Health. Although the County Regula-
tions attempt to establish some type of appeal from these orders,'
1 4
there still remains a question of appellate procedure raised by the
Pennsylvania "Air Pollution Control Act." Under its Powers of the
Department of Health,'5 one of the powers of the Pennsylvania De-
partment is to issue orders to any person causing air pollution. Upon
such order the person affected may, as stated in section 4004 (4.1),
appeal that order to the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Commission
within 30 days. This appeal must be in accordance with the provisions
of the Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law,' 6 any further appeal
from the Commission's decision is to be under the procedure set up
by the same Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law.' 7 The question
presented is whether action taken by the Allegheny County Health
Department is subject to this appellate procedure. It may be argued
that this question is answered within the Pennsylvania Air Pollution
Control Act itself where it states that:
13. Such procedures as keeping a written record, allowing cross-examination of wit-
nesses, and allowing the presence of attorneys as representatives of complainants. See,
Commonwealth v. Heindel, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d. 205 (1967), where the Pennsylvania Air
Pollution Control Commission was reversed for failure to conduct such procedures at the
administrative hearing.
14. ALL. Co. REGS. § 1722.1C, which will be discussed in more detail later in this
paper.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4004.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.1 et seq.
17. Note the procedure for the appeal taken in Commonwealth v. Glenn Alden Corp.,
418 Pa. 57, 210 A.2d 256 (1965).
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The procedures for the abatement, reduction, prevention and
control of Air Pollution set forth in this act shall not apply to
any political subdivision of the Commonwealth which has an ap-
proved Air Pollution agency. I8
This section also states, however, that such local procedures cannot
conflict with Pennsylvania rules and regulations regarding air pollu-
tion control. Therefore, it remains unclear whether appellate proce-
dure is part of a subdivision's "abatement, prevention and control of
air pollution" or whether the appellate procedures set up by Al-
legheny County conflict with the Pennsylvania rules and regulations.
The structure of the Pennsylvania "Air Pollution Control Act" ap-
pears to give the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Commission the power
to clarify these two questions. The act has nowhere clearly stated its
policy regarding appellate procedure of political subdivisions. In fact,
if any policy can be implied, it would be that the legislative intent was
to allow all possible authority at the local level. It therefore appears
that a directive from the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Com-
mission specifically approving Allegheny County's appellate proce-
dure could in no way be interpreted as either outside of the Com-
mission's authority or in contradiction of the intent of the Act.
Therefore, it is advisable for the state Commission to issue rules and
regulations clearly stating their position regarding the right of a local
air pollution control agency to establish its own appellate procedure.
Without such clarifying regulations, the Allegheny County air pollu-
tion control agencies and persons appealing from their orders, will
be forced to proceed by mere speculation and the answers to these
questions will be available only after time-consuming litigation in
the courts. 19 Whether a court could even answer these two questions
is debatable; it is not debatable that such litigation would result in
undue delay in enforcement of air quality standards.
DOES THE PRESENT ALLEGHENY COUNTY APPELLATE PROCEDURE
STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT?
Assuming for the sake of further discussion that Allegheny County
is not precluded from establishing its own appellate procedure, we
can then consider the effect of that procedure.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4012.
19. See, Retail Master Bakers v. Allegheny County, 400 Pa. 1, 161 A.2d 36 (1960)
where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was forced to decide whether or not county
health regulations contradicted state health regulations regarding bakeries. See also,
Philadelphia v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 147 A.2d 326 (1959).
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A. Section 1722 Hearings
The Allegheny County Regulations provide in Section 1722 that:
"Any person or owner who is aggrieved by a notice or order from the
Director may request and shall be granted a hearing .... ,,20 This sec-
tion obviously needs further clarification. Firstly, it does not tell
before what body the hearing is to be held. Secondly, it is silent on
whether or not this one hearing is to be the entire appellate proce-
dure or merely the first step before commencing the appellate pro-
cedure setup by the state air pollution act. It seems advisable that the
Allegheny County Department of Health proceed to establish clear
and complete appellate procedure (within any future limitations im-
posed by the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Commission) from orders
of the Director of the Allegheny County Department of Health. Not
only would such regulations expedite appeals, they might also narrow
the scope of judicial review of actions by the Allegheny County Di-
rector of Health. If the Section 1722 hearing fails to provide for the
presentation of evidence from both sides, the right of cross-examina-
tion to each side, and the subsequent basing of the decisions on ra-
tional grounds clearly stated for each side to know, judicial review
may go further than merely looking to see that the evidence substan-
tially supports the findings.2  The reviewing court might, in the ab-
sence of such procedural safeguards, grant the appellant a trial de
novo before the court, in effect, removing enforcement and discretion-
ary powers from the County Department of Health. Thus, in order
to preserve its powers, it would behoove the Allegheny County De-
partment of Health to provide a bona-fide hearing for those appealing
under Section 1722.
B. The Lack of Appellate Procedure from Emergency Orders
Another question regarding appellate procedure is presented in the
Allegheny County Regulations by its exclusion of the right to a
Section 1722 hearing for persons whose rights are decided without a
hearing pursuant to the power of the Director to issue Emergency
Orders. 22 Can an aggrieved person be completely denied the right to
20. ALL. Co. REGs., § 1722.1C.
21. See later discussion on scope of Section 1722 review.
22. ALL. Co. REGS., § 1722.1C.
399.
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an administrative hearing? Pennsylvania law requires some type of
orderly proceeding by an appropriate and impartial tribunal2 3 and
that the hearing body be bound by the fundamental concepts of fair-
ness and constitutional due process.24 These requirements, however,
do not necessarily require judicial process. It does generally mean,
however, that the party affected is to have notice of a hearing and an
opportunity to be heard.25 This Pennsylvania policy against allowing
an administrative agency to become a tyranny, giving no notice of
its hearings, if any, and giving no opportunity to aggrieved parties
to be heard, 26 seems to run counter to Allegheny County's policy re-
garding Emergency Orders. Granting that the nature of an emergency
order precludes the possibility of hearings before the order is en-
forced, some type of review hearing should be provided for parties
damaged by emergency orders. It is conceded that an appeal can pos-
sibly be had before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari to obtain judicial review of an emergency order,27 but it
seems an unrealistic approach in most cases due to cost and consump-
tion of time. A more immediate appeal to police the actions of the
Director is necessary if arbitrary use of the emergency power is to be
avoided. 28 In light of this consideration, it would be to the advantage
of Allegheny County to set up a procedure to afford a hearing after
an emergency order is issued and is being obeyed. Such a hearing,
if proper procedural safeguards are afforded (representation by counsel,
cross-examination of witnesses, and a requirement of a written deci-
sion stating rational grounds for sustaining an emergency order) would
afford the County air pollution control agencies a greater respect for
its determinations in the courts.29 Without such respect, a review court
23. State Real Estate Commission v. Fenstersheib, 89 Dauph. 306 (1968).
24. Taylor et. al., Appellants v. Weinstein, 207 Pa. Super. 251, 217 A.2d 817 (1966).
25. As in Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.31.
26. Hotchkiss Liquor License Case, 169 Pa. Super. 506, 83 A.2d 398 (1951).
27. Dauphin Deposit v. Meyers, 401 Pa. 230, 164 A.2d 86 (1960).
28. One might argue that the criteria for the existence of an emergency is clearly
established under Section 1717.2D of the Allegheny County Regulations. But within
1717.2D and 1722.1B, there is a great deal of room for discretion on the part of the
Director, e.g.: 1. What constitutes "adverse meteorological conditions"? 2. Is there
reason to believe the affected party is contributing in the least to the condition? 3. The
language of 1722.1B is broader than 1717.2D and includes discretionary decisions such
as when is their need for immediate action to "protect the health, safety, or welfare
of the public."
29. Agencies should never underestimate the importance of maintaining the respect
of the courts. In many instances, on close questions, respect by the courts can be enough
for them to give the agency the benefit of the doubt and thereby sway the case. This
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might grant a trial de novo for the aggrieved party, thus removing
from the Allegheny County Department of Health a portion of their
enforcement authority.30 Clearly, the County Health Department can
only hurt itself by denying post-enforcement hearings on emergency
orders.
The County Regulations seem justified, however, in denying a
party aggrieved by an emergency order the right to an appeal to a
specific judicial body. Judicial review of determinations of adminis-
trative agencies is not a matter of right and it may be granted or
denied at the will of the legislature as long as constitutional requisites
are met.3' Such constitutional requisites are met by the recommended
hearing procedure set forth in the preceding paragraph. The denial of
formal judicial appeal is also justified because there is always the
possibility of a judicial appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by
writ of certiorari,32 and, in the event of arbitrary and capricious
action by an agency, (which raises the issue of the agency's juris-
diction) appeal to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.38
C. Appeals From Variances-Who Has Standing?
The County Regulations have expressly established hearing and
appellate procedure for persons wishing to petition for a variance
from application of the emission standards.3 4 It establishes hearings
before the Board of Air Pollution Appeals and Variance Review
(hereafter referred to as Appeals Board). Notice of the hearings is to
be published beforehand. Upon the issuance of the Appeals Board's
decision, termed "final," the section provides for appeal to the Court
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Thus, assuming that Alle-
gheny County has the right to establish its own appellate procedure
without running afoul with the Pennsylvania "Air Pollution Control
respect is earned by an agency whose actions are characterized by freedom from bias,
allowing each party his say at hearings and having a record of bringing only valid
actions to court that are well documented.
30. See, Supra., Commonwealth v. Heindel, where sloppy hearing procedure resulted
in a judicial reversal of the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Commission's findings.
31. Estop v. U.S., 327 U.S. 114 (1945). • ,
32. Petition of Bell, 396 Pa. 592, 152 A.2d 731 (1959).
33. See, Upper Darby National Bank v. Smith, 67 Dauph. 3 (1954) where alleged
arbitrary and capricious action by the agency raised the constitutional issue of whether
the agency was operating within its jurisdiction.
34. ALL. Co. REGS., § 1703.1F.
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Act, ' 35 there appears to be no problem with the appellate procedure
from variance decisions as such.
A question is presented under this procedure, however, regarding
standing to bring an appeal before the Allegheny County Common
Pleas Court. 36 The language of this section seems to indicate a defini-
tion of standing much broader than the standing granted under the
Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law (A.A.L.). 3 The A.A.L's lan-
guage limits standing to those persons with a direct interest, not merely
an affected party. This policy greatly limits the number of persons who
can appeal.5 8 The Allegheny County Regulations, however, by its use
of "persons . . . adversely affected or aggrieved" seems to confer
standing to appeal on those who may not be so directly affected, but
who still may have a valid complaint.3 9 The "persons aggrieved" lan-
guage, however, has usually been held to require ownership of prop-
erty in the county of appeal where zoning ordinances and annexation
proceedings were involved. 40 To require ownership of property in
Allegheny County in order to have standing on appeal an air pollution
variance does not seem justified. While in the development of zoning
laws and annexation procedures living conditions are a consideration,
preservation and increase in land value is usually paramount, thus
the logic of requiring land ownership. In air pollution control, on
the other hand, living conditions are the most important considera-
tion.4' Therefore, it would make little sense to make land ownership
the criterion for allowing standing to appeal air pollution variances.
In this light, the County Regulation's use of "person suffering legal
wrong" as a criterion for standing also appears to imply further that
35. See earlier discussion of possible "conflicts" with state air pollution control
policy as stated in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4012.
36. "Such appeal, . . .may be made by any person suffering legal wrong or adversely
affected or aggrieved by the decision." ALL. CO. REGS., § 1703.1F10.
37. "Any person aggrieved thereby who has a direct interest in such adjudication
shall have the right to appeal therefrom."; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.41.
38. See, State Board of Funeral Directors v. Beaver Co. Funeral Directors Ass'n.,
10 Pa. D. & C.2d. 704 (1958) and Petition of Associated Theatres, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d. 537
(1963).
39. See, Giammaria Liquor License Case, 166 Pa. Super. 263, 70 A.2d 402 (1950), where
the court indicates the greater interest required for "person aggrieved" than for "person
adversely affected."
40. Appeal of Cleaver, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d. 483 (1961). See also, Pavelek v. New Sewickley
Twp., 60 Mun. 86 (1968), where "person Aggrieved" under an ordinance regarding junk
dealers had to have a "substantial and direct interest" in the ordinance to have standing;
in this case that interest was found through appellant's property ownership.
41. The Allegheny County Regulations indicate at Section 1713 regarding Nuisances
that it is its intent to encourage action by individuals and the public generally who are
injured or placed at a health hazard by "air contaminants." From this section it is a
fair implication to call such persons "adversely affected" within the language of Section
1703.IFO.
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there be no need for land ownership. Thus, by its own language, it
appears that residence or possibly mere occupational location within
Allegheny County, coupled with a showing that the variance grant
will affect the quality of the air the person breathes, could be all that
is required to appeal to Allegheny Common Pleas Court regarding
the grant of a variance. 42
While in one sense, such broad standing to appeal a variance is
good, in another, it may present a problem of whether or not the
person maintaining the appeal is enough affected to give an adequate
presentation of his side of the case. (The idea that the person with
the most to lose or gain will give the best argument for his side
should not be lightly discarded.) To avoid the possibility that the
appellant is not truly a party with a "case or controversy", 43 the Com-
mon Pleas Court of Allegheny County could, within the language of
Article 1703.1 F 10 of the County Regulations, require the appealing
party to establish a substantial case showing that he was, in fact, ad-
versely affected or aggrieved-what could be termed a prima facie
case for a nuisance suit based on the grant of the variance. Without
requirements such as these, the potential advantage of having such a
wide breadth of standing to appeal variances might be defeated by
fictitious appellants without true interests to advocate.
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
It is important for the Allegheny County Health Department and
potential appellants to know the appellate procedure for its own sake,
but appellate procedure is also important because of its effect on the
scope of judicial review that results. Whether the courts will grant the
appellant what amounts to a trial de novo or merely review the
agency's decision for abuse of discretion will greatly affect the day to
day operation and decision-making power of the Allegheny County
Health Department. Since the scope of judicial review is greatly af-
fected by the particular appellate procedure, discussion of scope will
be separated into the three basic appellate procedures discussed earlier
under the Allegheny County Regulations: A. Appeals from 1722
hearings on Director's orders; B. Appeals from the Director's emer-
42. The total lack of the word "party" in the standing section destroys any argument
that an appellant must have been a party at the hearing before the Appeals Board.
43. Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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gency orders which are not subject to 1722 hearings; and C. Variance
appeals to Allegheny County Common Pleas.
A. Appeals From 1722 Hearings
Since there is no judicial or administrative review provided under
the County Regulations from a decision at a 1722 hearing, such review
will be either by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court on the issue
of the agency's jurisdiction or by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
by writ of certiorari. In the former case, since a jurisdictional issue
is raised, the sole question on review will be whether the agency was
acting within its jurisdiction in the instant decision. For this inquiry,
the Commonwealth Court may only look to see that the agency is
not abusing its discretion, thus judicial review is limited.44 On a writ
of certiorari to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, the scope
of review will depend on the language of Section 1722. Pennsylvania
courts have generally made a distinction between administrative deci-
sions based on statutorily conferred discretion and those where the
agency is performing this quasi-judicial function without specific
statutory authority. 45 Under this distinction, courts have contended
that when the legislature has conferred upon an agency a discretionary
power, it was only logical that the court should seek to follow legis-
lative intent by leaving to this agency the bulk of its discretion,
thereby limiting judicial review to reversal of this agency only if it
abused the discretion conferred upon it:46 referred to as narrow
certiorari. Specifically, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has required
the legislature, in conferring this discretion upon the agency, to state
that the agency's decision shall be "final" and without a right of appeal
to the courts. 47 On the other hand, when there is no such clear intent
to give the agency the discretionary power and the agency has none-
theless exercised discretion, (what Weichman calls a "quasi-judicial"
decision) then the reviewing court should look to see if this decision
is supported by substantial evidence: a degree of review referred to
as broad certiorari. With this distinction in mind, we must look to
the language of the Allegheny County Regulations, namely Section
44. Id., Upper Darby National Bank v. Smith, 67 Dauph. 3 (1954).
45. Pennsylvania State Police v. Weichman, 86 Dauph. 323 (1966).
46. Id.
47. Swank v. Myers, 386 Pa. 331, 126 A.2d 267 (1956) and Man 0' War Racing Ass'n.
v. State Horse Racing Commission, 433 Pa. 432, 250 A.2d 172 (1969), reviewed at 8 DuQ.
L. REV. 161 (1970).
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1722, to see if any discretion of the judicial nature is conferred upon
the hearing body. Since Section 1722 is not worded so as to confer
upon the hearing body a broad discretion or to make the hearing
decision final and not subject to judicial review, the scope of review
to the Supreme Court should be broad certiorari, looking to see that
the decision is based on substantial evidence.
B. Appeals From Emergency Orders
The scope of review of emergency orders of the Director appears to
follow the pattern of review of 1722 hearings. Since there can be an
appeal to the Commonwealth Court on the jurisdictional issue, its
review is limited to the single issue of abuse of discretion. With the
Supreme Court review by writ of certiorari, the scope will be broad
since no language in the Allegheny County Regulations specifically
makes the Director's emergency orders final or not subject to judicial
review.
C. Appeals From Variance Decisions
The big question that arises when variance appeals are taken to
the Allegheny County Common Pleas Court is the scope of review
that will be made of the Appeals Board's decisions. Under the Penn-
sylvania Motor Vehicle Code,48 where an appeal is provided to the
common pleas court of the defendant's county from the Secretary of
Revenue's decision to suspend a license, the action of the common
pleas court is to grant a trial de novo, considering anew all of the
evidence pro and con regarding the suspension. 49 The wording of this
statute, however, indicates that the appeal to the common pleas court
is to take the form of a trial de novo,50 while the Allegheny Regu-
lations are silent regarding the scope of the review in the Court of
Common Pleas. Thus, it appears that a trial de novo should not be
implied from the silence of the Allegheny County Regulations.51 A
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 192(b).
49. Commonwealth v. Antolich, 194 Pa. Super. 300, 166 A.2d 541 (1961); Common-
wealth v. Herzog, 359 Pa. 641, 60 A.2d 37 (1948).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 192.
51. See, Booker Hotel Corp. Liquor License Case, 175 Pa. Super. 89, 103 A.2d 486
(1954), where the court held that in the absence of specific language granting to the
reviewing court the right to grant a trial de novo, the reviewing common pleas court
is not to take new testimony, but to only use the testimony taken by the board and
review for abuse of discretion.
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better approach to finding the appropriate scope of judicial review
by Common Pleas Court is by drawing an analogy between an appeal
to Common Pleas Court and an appeal by writ of certiorari to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. As mentioned earlier, the scope of the
Supreme Court's review on certiorari depends on the degree of dis-
cretion conferred upon the agency by the appropriate statute. It is
submitted that the Allegheny County Common Pleas Court should
use this method of determining its scope of review. Applying this test,
it is clear that the Allegheny County Regulations intended to confer
a high degree of discretion upon the Appeals Board. This deduction
that such was their intent comes not only from the use of the word
"final" in reference to the Appeals Board's decisions, but also from
the power conferred upon the Board to subpoena witnesses, to admin-
ister any oaths necessary for testimony, and to use broad discretionary
powers specifically conferred on the Appeals Board by Section 1704.
Wide discretion having clearly been conferred upon the Appeals
Board, the scope of the Allegheny County Common Pleas Court's
review on Board decisions should be limited to an inquiry as to
whether or not the Board has abused its discretion. 52
SUMMARY
There remain many questions unanswered regarding appellate pro-
cedure, but many can be answered through positive action by the
Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Commission and by the Pennsyl-
vania and Allegheny County Departments of Health. It might be
argued that these agencies are without authority to take any action
to establish appellate procedure and that any action by them in this
direction may end up in a legal battle over whether or not it is
solely a legislative decision. What appears more certain, however, is
that if they fail to act on these problems of appellate procedure and
the potential conflicts between state and county action, they will
surely end up in long, time-consuming court battles that will put
enforcement of the Allegheny County air quality standards at a
standstill.
ROBERT S. BAILEY
52. See, Mutual Supply Co. Appeal, 366 Pa. 424, 77 A.2d 612 (1951) where Allegheny
County Common Pleas Court granted a full hearing on an appeal from a Board of Ad-justments decision on a zoning variance because the controlling law specifically provided
for trial de novo at Common Pleas. See also, Crawford Zoning Case, 358 Pa. 636, 57 A.2d
862 (1948), where the scope of a board's decision at Delaware County Common Pleas
was solely whether the board abused its discretion.
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